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<The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP: The World Ponders>
- Q1The accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant reached Level 7. Why wasn't the damage minimised?
- Q2What do you think about responses to the accident by TEPCO, NSC, NISA, and the government?
- Q3Did the government and TEPCO correctly release information on evacuation orders and spread of radioactive substances?
- Q4What challenges does decommissioning bring?
- Q5When a plant is decommissioned, what other problems are caused by the disposal of highly radioactive waste?
- Q6What should the world do to avoid serious nuclear disasters in future?
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Q1 The accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant reached Level 7. Why wasn't the damage minimised?
Crisis measures awareness should have its root. Comparing with the crisis measures awareness of other countries including the United States, our sense of impending crisis is totally weak when I look back on myself as one of the people of Japan. It is because we have been lacking in the sense of crisis to tackle with a catastrophe.
Over-optimistic assumption at the design and clumsiness of response by TEPCO and the government after the accident.
Lack of the sense of crisis control of Tokyo Electric. Confirmation of location of the emergency power supply, response in case when the emergency power is lost it, training (and the related question) along the manual at emergency, information sharing between the site and the officers in charge regarding the crisis control and so on. It all comes down to lack of crisis control by the executives and employees of TEPCO.
It must have been the cause that, even there were people who pointed out the possibility of the accident, they were ignored as minority opinions. It also must have been the fact that atomic energy were promoted by the government, electric power companies, scholars and media altogether. The Liberal Democratic Party should owe much responsibility. In terms of minimizing the damage, I doubt the existence of the manual and training assuming such accidents. The promotion of nuclear plants itself would have been the cause.
While they seemed to have done the simulation that assumed various malfunction, it was impossible to have the assumption of "complete blackout" in that. That was the reason of the mistake. The simulation should be thoroughly done.
Supply facilities for the emergency power and the work system. They underestimated the height of tsunami. Lack of awareness in the disaster prevention.
Upon the occurrence of the complete blackout caused by the unexpected tsunami, their manual contents for accident were insufficient and emergency training weren't carried out enough. Plus, I feel that every response fell behind time as TEPCO which was supposed to be technically well-informed couldn't take the leadership in terms of handling the accident.
Their initial reaction system is insufficient. TEPCO's employees wouldn't have imagined that such situation could occur.
Insufficient crisis control system. Including the responses for "out-of-expectation" situation, they couldn't do anything because they were conceited and taking things for granted, could they? Plus, they tried too much to solve the issue only in the country due to the invisible pride being the major economy, didn't they?
Self-conceit of TEPCO. It is intolerable for them to assume what has happened as "unexpected" though they had overlooked the preventable situation by considering the worst case scenario. Plus their responses after the plant got damaged, lack of sincerity in their explanation to the people and information full of fallacy. I can never trust what TEPCO says.
The government which wasn't able to predict such large earthquake and tsunami and TEPCO have the responsibility. The earthquake was a natural disaster, but I think what happened was a man-made disaster.
It is evident that it was the government's mistake not being able to take the initial action and make the judgment for the worst case scenario. Naoto Kan, who was the Prime Minister at that time, explained that he was irritated because he couldn't get the information. A minister said that he shouldn't make the citizens fall into a panic. There may be an unnecessary worry for saving the people's lives. What were both the government and TEPCO afraid of?
The government that couldn't be ready to carry out crisis control. In other words, the awareness of us, Japanese citizens, who have been accepting such government.
About the government's response, they should have concentrated more knowledge of the experts. I found that their sense of impending crisis was too low.
Q1
No.0072
USA
Mark Hibbs
Senior associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=expert_view&expert_id=478You will leave the NHK website when you access this link.
Q1
No.0071
Portugal
Manuel Alonso
Professor, Nuclear Fusion Centre, Technical University of Lisbon
https://fenix.ist.utl.pt/homepage/ist23295?locale=en_ENYou will leave the NHK website when you access this link.

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