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<The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP: The World Ponders>

  • Q1The accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant reached Level 7. Why wasn't the damage minimised?
  • Q2What do you think about responses to the accident by TEPCO, NSC, NISA, and the government?
  • Q3Did the government and TEPCO correctly release information on evacuation orders and spread of radioactive substances?
  • Q4What challenges does decommissioning bring?
  • Q5When a plant is decommissioned, what other problems are caused by the disposal of highly radioactive waste?
  • Q6What should the world do to avoid serious nuclear disasters in future?
  • MovieView the movie list

Q1 The accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant reached Level 7. Why wasn't the damage minimised?

Q1
No.0110

Japan

Judgment

Unemployed

Avoidance of responsibility

Even though all the power went out at the plants but TEPCO still thought they could get away from the responsibility. It did look like that on TV. They did not act anything promptly at the initial stage of the accidentand because of their irresponsibility led to proliferation of radiation to other areas. Japanese soil and people are exposed to radiation. The GE designer of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Mark 1 pointed out that there would be a risk of hydrogen explosion. So to prevent it from happening, he asked for a renovation of the reactor. After setting up a ventilation, they found out after that they forgot or intended not to set up a pricy filter on the ventilation so that is why they could not open it properly. They must set up the safest power generating system without having all the power go off under such an intense circumstance. All the power went off under a single condition, this is not acceptable and very irresponsible. They only acted to get avoid the responsibility and limit the information to us. If they acted more dilligently at the initial stage, the damage would not have spread out this big.

Q1
No.0109

Japan

Kyoko Ishii

English language instructor

Wrong speculation: No disaster will happen at the reactor in Japan

We should have learned a valuable lesson at both nuclear incidents in the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan made a wrong assumption that there would not be any serious accidents. But their speculation was incorrect. I think, that is the reason. That is why people could not come up with prompt countermeasure. It led to misleading of informations, which were not given to the people on time.

Q1
No.0108

USA

Michael Corradini

Professor, Dept of Engineering Physics, University of Wisconsin

Expiration of the limitation period for viewing video

Q1
No.0107

Canada

John Luxat

Professor, Dept of Engineering Physics, McMaster University

Expiration of the limitation period for viewing video

Q1
No.0106

Japan

Ao Sansai

As the "safety myth" has been firmly established by the existence of nuclear power villages, even the on-site managers have become the believers of the myth. When something that has been considered not to happen occurs, there is no way to handle it.

Q1
No.0105

Japan

Windom

As terrible as TEPCO, lack of policy of the official residence as the headquarters was the biggest cause.

Q1
No.0104

Japan

Kokka-

Despite the unprecedented situation, I feel that the cause lies in the negligence / over-optimistic recognition of the organization. Living in South Chiba, we get affected by the situation depending on the direction of the wind in the four seasons. In fact, after radioactive materials were detected in rice, both the producers and consumers have been feeling insecure, and shipment of some vegetables have stopped. About nuclear power generation, our readiness so as to disseminate it deeply and widely in educational occasions should be required...

Q1
No.0103

Japan

Anonimity

It must have been caused by the underestimation of accident and by the safety myth. It seems to be the reality that even the experts didn't understand the situation well. We should have asked for help from the United States, shouldn't we?

Q1
No.0102

Japan

Raou

In the first place, lack of preparation by their overconfidence in the safety is the major factor. Secondly, being the locus of responsibility is unclear, the flow of report and report line did not function.

Q1
No.0101

Japan

takunami

Because they underestimated an earthquake, the prevention was insufficient. In addition, proper information disclosure wasn't done even after the accident, the opinions differed among the experts and the treatment fell behind times.

Q1
No.0100

Japan

oo

Although it had been told by the IAEA and NRC over the years to take measures for complete blackout to counter terrorism, the official residence fell into dysfunction in a helter-skelter way and their understanding with each other didn't go smooth, which amplified the mutual distrust because the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and TEPCO ignored it and weren't able to cope at all with the situation of complete blackout that occurred due to the earthquake. Even though three top-ranking officials including the Minister of Education knew the existence of SPEEDI, they owe heavy responsibility for not o having said it in the meeting of the official residence.

Q1
No.0099

Japan

Neko Mama

The scale of tsunami was above assumption. They declined global cooperation even though they were stumble around in the dark for a solution. The call-up for the experts were behind time. Application of SPEEDI was been too late. Poor responses of the government.

Q1
No.0098

Japan

Kyoukomachi

I can't help but thinking that it was caused by the self-conceit that atomic energy was safe and negligence in preparation by stinting on the expenses.

Q1
No.0097

Japan

Anonimity

Lack (or insufficiency) of safety measures. To ensure the realistic security, it is basic to secure the safety by the ways that can be served within the institution. Emergency power facility (which should be installed on the top level of earthquake and tsunami proof building), emergency cooling facility (which should be installed within an earthquake and tsunami proof building) and communication instruments between each safety device should be build with earthquake-resistant structure. (Each connection plumbing / electronic plumbing isn't quake-resistant.)

Q1
No.0096

Japan

Redfahrer

The point that nothing was considered at all about the setting of the most important emergency power supply. They cannot argue when they are called being addicted to peace or safety with the fact they had located the emergency power-supply unit on the low level upon building the plant on the coast of the northeastern Pacific side where the tsunami frequently caused damages. I also find it very difficult to understand that they were really lazy regarding the use of emergency condenser. When I had engaged in plane operation duties before, I always steered the aircrafts thinking about what kind of trouble would occur during a flight and what kind of measures would be possible for it. In driving a vehicle or operating a device with the risks, you should think that the training in prediction of and actions to be taken upon troubles as a part of the duties.

Q1
No.0095

Japan

aya

A spare power supply wasn't located in in the waterproof institution. The reactor 4's fuel pool was on the upper level of the building.

Q1
No.0094

Japan

TAKA

Even though the tsunami damage was assumed, they didn't take precautionary measures such as putting the emergency power supply in the hill.

Q1
No.0093

Japan

Sakuranbo san

Although the members of the Diet and scholars had told the danger of serious atomic energy accident to be triggered by an earthquake or tsunami to TEPCO over and over again, such serious accident occurred as TEPCO was only preoccupied with the profit and ignored the assumption of the accident. In fact, no serious accident happened at Onagawa nuclear plant of the Tohoku Electric Power.

Q1
No.0092

Japan

Bisukie

Earlier response and further respect to the opinion of domestic experts.

Q1
No.0091

Japan

Anonimity

The point that no training was performed at all as well as the absence of emergency manual, which was based on the safety myth that no accident would as the nuclear plants were safe.

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