June 2011
From a Case of the Public Television Service Foundation (PTS) of Taiwan
Ken-ichi Yamada
There are signs that national governments are increasing their clout over public service broadcasters across the glove. In France the power of appointment of public broadcaster’s president has been shifted from an independent regulatory body to the French president. In Korea, KBS president, who had been appointed during the former administration, was severely criticized by the ruling party after the broadcaster’s precise coverage of anti-government demonstration, and was finally dismissed by the Korean president. Taiwan also saw a series of motions where the government exerted its influence on executive personnel changes of the Public Television Service Foundation (PTS), which prompted a legal battle between protesting executives and the government. In this article the author examines “political independence” of swaying broadcasters based on research carried out in late February 2011in Taiwan, focusing on personnel disputes in PTS.
PTS was launched in 1998. The broadcaster acquired the Chinese Television System and multiple channels for ethnic minority groups over the first ten years to form a huge group, the Taiwan Broadcasting System that owns five analogue channels after having. Their political neutrality and quality programs have been highly acclaimed by intellectuals and experts. However, when a person, who was said to have a close tie with the then ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), assumed the presidency in 2007, this appointment triggered a strong opposition from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). Consequently KTM that had a majority at the Legislative Yuan (parliament) “froze” half of the annual PTS budget. Furthermore, after KMT successfully overturned the government in the 2008 general election, they revised the legislation to increase the number of PTS directors and appointed several KMT supporters as directors to replace the Chair of Board. In the process, however, they were bitterly criticized by an NGO consisting of media scholars and experts as their actions were “political intervention over public broadcasting.” Besides, the replaced Chair filed a provisional disposition to suspend the new Chair. Thus, a perpetual lawsuit battle between the authority and the Chair was ignited. Meanwhile, upon the expiration of the term of directors, judging committee was convened to select new directors, which resulted in a quagmire; most of the candidates were unable to win the necessary three-quarters of votes and were rejected due to the opposition DPP’s concerted action. We still do not know when a new board of directors will be set up. Behind the political battle over the PTS executive personnel lies a bipolar confrontation in society which is often observed in Taiwan and Korea. Against such backdrop, how should the political independence of public broadcasters be secured? Wu Feng-shan, Chair of the 1st and 2nd Board, who were accepted by both KMT and DPP, revisits a fundamental principle of public broadcasters—supraparty. On this premise, he advocates self-restraint of the ruling and opposite parties, enforcement of supervision by citizen over the management of PTS, and directors’ common-good-oriented actions without thinking about their party affiliations. In the long run, it shall be important to ease the social bipolar confrontation, but for now it is essential to make various efforts both in institutional and operational terms, centering on public broadcasters’ “expanded disclosure of information” to the public.